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Letter from Co-Chairs of the Peterson-Pew 
Commission on Budget Reform
We are proud to present this report on behalf of all the members of the Peterson-Pew Commission on 
Budget Reform. It is the product of a difﬁ cult but rewarding year of wrestling with an issue of critical 
concern — a federal debt that is out of control. 
The Commission members share a common concern: the ﬁ scal future we leave to succeeding genera-
tions will lower their standards of living. It is our strong belief that we must begin to take action now to 
prevent that from happening. 
This report’s recommendations stem from the experience and expertise of the Commission’s members. 
Our plan will be difﬁ cult to implement. Our proposed approach will require signiﬁ cant policy changes 
and raising taxes and cutting spending are always very difﬁ cult. But we ﬁ rmly believe that policymakers 
will have to do both to turn back the tide of red ink. 
As Congress and the White House determine what process they want to use to meet the nation’s ﬁ s-
cal challenges—whether a commission, a task force, the normal legislative structure, or some other 
process—we look forward to working with policymakers in both parties and believe the ideas in this 
report will be useful. 
In the coming year, the Commission will publish a detailed companion report with additional recom-
mendations on reforming the budget process. That report will propose multiple other budget process 
tools to help lawmakers reach and maintain a stable level of debt. 
On behalf of the entire Commission, we also want to thank the Peter G. Peterson Foundation, The 
Pew Charitable Trusts, our many consultants, and all the individuals and organizations that regularly 
advised us. We also thank our superb staff. 
  Bill Frenzel    Tim Penny        Charlie Stenholm
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A call to action
Over the past year alone, the public debt of the United 
States rose sharply from 41 to 53 percent of gross domestic 
product (GDP). Under reasonable assumptions, the debt is 
projected to grow steadily, reaching 85 percent of GDP by 
2018, 100 percent by 2022, and 200 percent in 2038. 
However, before the debt reached such high levels, the 
United States would almost certainly experience a debt-
driven crisis—something previously viewed as almost 
unfathomable in the world’s largest economy. The crisis 
could unfold gradually or it could happen suddenly, but 
with great costs either way. The tipping point is impossible 
to predict, but the United States is already hearing con-
cerns about its ﬁ scal management from some of its largest 
creditors, and the country is uncomfortably vulnerable to 
shifts in conﬁ dence around the world.  
The Peterson-Pew Commission on Budget Reform is call-
ing for Congress and the White House to take immediate 
action to stem the growing federal debt. Our proposal is 
crafted both to accommodate the needs of the still-recov-
ering economy, and reﬂ ect the tremendous risks posed by 
the large and expanding debt burden. We recommend that 
Congress and the White House formulate a ﬁ scal frame-
work that includes:
• A commitment to stabilize the public debt over the 
medium term; 
• Speciﬁ c policies to stabilize the debt; 
• Annual debt targets with an automatic enforcement 
mechanism to ensure targets are met; and 
• A commitment to reduce further the debt level over the 
longer term. 
The looming ﬁ scal crisis
The economic crisis that the United States just experi-
enced resulted in the deterioration of the country’s ﬁ scal 
metrics as revenue plummeted and spending soared due 
to the recession’s effects and the government’s response. 
The 2009 budget deﬁ cit was $1.4 trillion, almost 10 per-
cent of GDP. The public debt grew 31 percent from $5.8 
trillion to $7.6 trillion. And the total debt, which includes 
what the government has borrowed from itself, grew from 
almost $10 trillion to $11.9 trillion. 
However, even after the recession abates, its lingering 
effect, the extension of a number of deﬁ cit-ﬁ nanced poli-
cies, demographic changes, and growing health care costs 
will all create an unsustainable ﬁ scal situation where the 
debt will continue to grow as a share of the economy. 
Under the Commission’s “ﬁ scal baseline” (Box 1), which 
assumes the extension of many of the 2001 and 2003 tax 
cuts and other expiring policies, lower war costs, and dis-
cretionary spending that keeps pace with the economy, the 
United States would see: 
• Total government spending—driven by an aging popu-
lation and rising health care costs—rise from 25 percent 
of GDP today to 36 percent in 2038. 
• Revenue—which fell to below 15 percent of GDP during 
the recession—grow gradually to 18.5 percent in 2018, 
surpassing historical averages, but not by nearly enough 
to keep pace with spending. 
• Deﬁ cits slip from their current level of 10 percent of 
GDP to below 6 percent over the next ﬁ ve years but rise 
to above 16 percent in 2038. 
Without a dramatic shift in course, the debt will grow to 
unprecedented levels, breaking the 200 percent mark 
in 2038. Well before the debt approaches such startling 
heights, fears of inﬂ ation and a prospective decline in the 
value of the dollar would cause investors to demand higher 
interest rates and shift out of U.S. Treasury securities. The 
excessive debt would also affect citizens in their everyday 
lives by harming the American standard of living through 
slower economic growth and dampening wages, and 
shrinking the government’s ability to reduce taxes, invest, 
or provide a safety net. 
Red Ink Rising: A Call to Action to Stem the Mounting Federal Debt
Executive Summary
4 the peterson-pew commission on budget reform
Stabilizing the debt
The Peterson-Pew Commission on Budget Reform knows 
that ﬁ scal problems of this size cannot be ﬁ xed overnight 
or even in a year. Indeed, rushing the process could harm 
the economy, choking off the budding recovery. But to buy 
some breathing room, the United States must show its 
creditors that it is serious about stabilizing the federal debt 
over a reasonable timeframe. Both spending cuts and tax 
increases will be necessary.
The Commission recommends that Congress and the 
White House follow a six-step plan:
Step 1: Commit immediately to stabilize the debt at 60 
percent of GDP by 2018;
Step 2: Develop a speciﬁ c and credible debt stabilization 
package in 2010;
Step 3: Begin to phase in policy changes in 2012;
Step 4: Review progress annually and implement an 
enforcement regime to stay on track;
Step 5: Stabilize the debt by 2018; and 
Step 6: Continue to reduce the debt as a share of the econ-
omy over the longer term. 
1. Commit immediately to stabilize the 
debt at 60 percent of GDP by 2018.
Congress and the White House should immediately com-
mit to stabilizing the public debt at a reasonable level over 
a reasonable timeframe: we recommend 60 percent of 
GDP by 2018. Waiting too long could fail to reassure cred-
itors—one of the primary objectives of acting quickly. The 
“announcement effect” of such a commitment, if credible, 
can have positive economic effects by signaling that the 
United States is serious about reducing its debt.
We believe that the 60 percent goal is the most ambitious 
yet realistic goal that can be achieved in this timeframe. 
The 60 percent debt threshold is now an international 
standard—regularly identiﬁ ed by the European Union 
(EU) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as a rea-
sonable debt target. A more ambitious target could easily 
prove to be such a heavy political lift that lawmakers would 
not embrace it or it would not be credible. Given the sig-
niﬁ cant risks of high U.S. debt, however, a less aggressive 
target might be insufﬁ cient to reassure markets. 
While cutting government spending or raising taxes too 
early could slow or reverse the economic recovery, other 
countries have shown that a credible commitment to reduc-
ing the debt prior to actual policy changes can improve 
creditors’ expectations and diminish the risks of a debt-
driven crisis. A number of advanced countries including 
Canada and Sweden offer ﬁ scal success stories (Box 5). 
2. Develop a speciﬁ c and credible 
debt stabilization package in 2010.
A glide path for getting from today to 2018 is critical. So are the 
speciﬁ c policies. Congress and the White House must agree 
on the necessary reforms and the timing for implementing 
them. We do not recommend a speciﬁ c mix but believe that 
both spending cuts and tax increases will be necessary.
Under the Commission’s ﬁ scal baseline, average annual 
deﬁ cits are projected to be about 6 percent of GDP. To 
meet the proposed goal, the average deﬁ cit would need 
to shrink to about 2 percent. For illustrative purposes, we 
propose a glide path that starts gradually with a deﬁ cit of 
5 percent in 2012 and that requires a deﬁ cit of less than 1 
percent by 2018. We allow seven years for the plan so that 
the impact of policy changes made in any single year is not 
drastic and does not stall the recovery of the economy.    
The magnitude of deﬁ cit reduction needed to reach the 60 
percent goal depends on the level of debt when policymak-
ers start. If no new deﬁ cit-ﬁ nanced policies were added to 
the budget and any extensions of expiring policies were 
paid for, deﬁ cits would average around 3 percent of GDP, 
instead of 6 percent, and would only need to shrink to 
around 2 percent to meet the Commission’s goal—clearly 
a more manageable scenario. 
3. Begin to phase in policy changes in 2012.
Given current economic conditions, we recommend wait-
ing to implement the policy changes until 2012. Clearly, 
policymakers need to closely monitor economic condi-
tions between now and then, but making aggressive 
changes any earlier could harm the economic recovery, 
particularly with unemployment reaching a 25-year high 
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in 2009. However, waiting any longer could undermine 
the plan’s credibility and leave the country reliant on 
excessively high borrowing for too long with no plan in 
place to change course. Some policymakers will no doubt 
try to use the struggling economy as an excuse for delay. 
Keep in mind however, that not putting a plan in place 
could derail the economic recovery. 
4. Review progress annually and implement 
an enforcement regime to stay on track.
Once a plan is adopted, it will be critical to have a mecha-
nism to ensure that it stays on track. We suggest a broad-
based companion enforcement mechanism, or a “debt 
trigger.” The trigger would take effect if an annual debt tar-
get were missed. Any breach of the target would be offset 
through automatic spending reductions and tax increases. 
The Commission recommends that the trigger apply 
equally to spending and revenue. There would be a broad-
based surtax, and all programs, projects, and activities 
would be subject to this trigger. The trigger should be puni-
tive enough to cause lawmakers to act but realistic enough 
that it can be pulled as a last resort if policymakers fail to 
act or select policies that fall short of the goal. 
5. Stabilize the debt by 2018.
Reducing the debt to 60 percent of GDP will be no small 
feat. It will require small changes in the ﬁ rst year from the 
projected level of 69 percent to 68 percent but, more sig-
niﬁ cantly, will require a dramatic deviation from the cur-
rent debt path. Preventing that projected path is critical for 
the United States if it is to avoid the economic risks associ-
ated with excessive debt. 
But hitting a 60 percent target is, in and of itself, not a suf-
ﬁ cient goal. What matters just as much—if not more—is 
that the debt does not continue to grow as a share of the 
economy thereafter. This makes deriving a package of rev-
enue increases and spending cuts to bring the debt down 
to 60 percent even more difﬁ cult. It would be easier if 
policymakers could implement temporary measures, tim-
ing shifts, and short-term policies that did not address the 
major drivers of the budget’s growth. This shortsighted-
ness, however, would leave the debt on track to grow again 
after the medium-term goal was achieved. 
To be effective over the longer term, a stabilization package 
will have to include permanent changes to current policies 
and must be weighted to control the budget’s most prob-
lematic areas. 
We believe the problem is so large that nearly all areas of 
the budget will be affected, and certainly both spending and 
taxes will have to be part of the ultimate package. Reforms 
in programs that are growing faster than the economy—
notably Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security, and certain tax 
policies—afford the best opportunities for savings and will 
provide the greatest beneﬁ ts to longer term debt stability. 
6. Continue to reduce the debt as a share of 
the economy over the longer term. 
Though preventing the debt from expanding again over the 
coming decades will be quite challenging given the demo-
graphic and health care cost pressures, we believe that poli-
cymakers must, over time, bring the debt down beyond the 
initial 60 percent target to something closer to the U.S. 
historical ﬁ fty-year average of below 40 percent. 
Fiscally-responsible federal policies are necessary so that 
the government has the ﬁ scal ﬂ exibility to respond to cri-
ses. Even though the United States had budget deﬁ cits 
when the recent economic and ﬁ nancial crises hit, the 
relatively low level of debt as a share of the economy gave 
policymakers the ability to respond quickly and borrow 
large amounts to respond to those crises without worry-
ing about the federal government’s ability to borrow. If the 
debt level had been at its current level, or where it is pro-
jected to grow to, responding to the economic crisis would 
have been much more challenging. 
Implementing reforms that slow the growth of govern-
ment spending, keep revenue apace with spending, and 
are conducive to economic growth will be critical to bring-
ing down the debt levels further. Ultimately, this task will 
almost certainly require more than one package of debt 
reduction. The Commission hopes that policymakers will 
monitor the debt to ensure that it stays at a manageable 
level and does not grow faster than the economy. Ensuring 
the future ﬁ scal health of the country depends on it. 
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box 1. The Commission’s ﬁ scal baseline 
The Commission created a baseline scenario to illustrate the path of likely policies and the magnitude of the ﬁ scal 
challenges the country faces. The Commission’s ﬁ scal baseline starts with the standard Congressional Budget Ofﬁ ce 
(CBO) August “current law” baseline, adjusted to reﬂ ect actual numbers for 2009. The baseline then incorporates 
the effects of several tax and spending policies likely to be enacted. In particular, it assumes: 
• The renewal of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts, set to expire in 2010, for families making less than 
$250,000 a year and individuals making less than $200,000. 
• A freeze in the estate tax at its 2009 levels, rather than its elimination in 2010 and then a 
return to pre-2001 levels in 2011 and beyond. 
• A continuation of the annual “patch” of AMT that limits its impact on middle and upper-middle income earners. 
• A permanent freeze on Medicare physician payment rates, replacing the 21 percent reduction 
scheduled to occur next year and small subsequent reductions scheduled thereafter.
• A gradual decline in spending on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan so that troop levels would fall from
about 210,000 in 2009 to 75,000 by 2014, with any additional deployments fully-offset within the budget.
• An increase in normal discretionary spending so that it grows at the rate of economic growth rather than inﬂ ation.
The Commission uses the ﬁ scal baseline to illustrate the magnitude of the debt reduction policymakers face. It should 
in no way be taken as an expression of the Commission’s support for any or all of the policies included in the baseline. 
In fact, sticking to “current law” policies would make it far easier to reduce debt levels to 60 percent of GDP.
Comparison of baselines, 2010-2018
current law baseline
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
percentage of gdp
Debt 61 64 65 65 65 66 66 67 66
Deﬁ cit 9.6 6.1 3.7 3.2 3.2 3.1 3.3 3.2 3.1
billions of dollars
Debt 8,760 9,670 10,270 10,750 11,310 11,850 12,440 13,030 13,460
Deﬁ cit 1,380 920 590 540 560 560 620 630 620
commission’s fiscal baseline
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
percentage of gdp
Debt 61 66 69 70 73 76 79 83 85
Deﬁ cit 9.7 7.6 5.8 5.6 5.8 5.9 6.4 6.6 6.8
billions of dollars
Debt 8,780 9,910 10,820 11,690 12,700 13,740 14,910 16,160 17,350
Deﬁ cit 1,400 1,140 910 920 1,000 1,060 1,200 1,300 1,380
Note: Commission staff used the current law baseline estimates from CBO’s The Budget and Economic Outlook: An Update, August 2009 and then updated the 
out-year debt numbers based on 2009 debt data from the Department of the Treasury, Monthly Statement of Public Debt.
Source: Congressional Budget Ofﬁ ce data and Commission’s ﬁ scal baseline.
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The United States has just had its highest budget deﬁ cit 
since just after World War II, and the government’s public 
debt has increased to a near record high as a share of the 
economy in the post-war period. In 2009 alone, the public 
debt rose from $5.8 trillion (41 percent of GDP) to $7.6 tril-
lion (53 percent)1. Much of this increase came from the eco-
nomic and ﬁ nancial crises, which fueled a dramatic increase 
in government spending for economic stimulus efforts and 
ﬁ nancial market interventions, and shrank personal and 
corporate incomes and thus government revenue. 
The economy is expected to recover, but the federal budget 
may not. Even before the economic downturn, the govern-
ment was running deﬁ cits that were expected to grow as 
a share of the economy over the longer term. The huge 
expenses incurred to deal with the recession have exacer-
bated the growing national debt, making it a more imme-
diate threat to the country’s ﬁ scal future. The extension 
of deﬁ cit-ﬁ nanced policies in the medium term, and the 
aging of the population and growing health care costs over 
the longer term, mean that our annual deﬁ cits will not 
return to a sustainable path and that federal debt will reach 
unprecedented levels.
Without preventive action, debt will continue to accumu-
late, leading to a dangerous ﬁ scal situation. Interest pay-
ments will continue to grow, squeezing out important pri-
orities. Under the Commission’s “ﬁ scal baseline”—which 
assumes the extension of many of the 2001 and 2003 tax 
cuts and other expiring policies, lower war costs, and dis-
cretionary spending that keeps pace with the economy (Box 
1)—Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, and net interest 
combined will exceed total federal revenue by 2027. 
Such high borrowing is not sustainable. Deﬁ cits and 
the associated rise in debt may be a necessary one-time 
response to a major economic recession but if they persist 
for too long, they can put the economy at risk. An ever-
growing debt would likely hurt the American standard of 
living by fueling inﬂ ation, forcing up interest rates, damp-
ening wages, slowing economic growth and job creation, 
and shrinking the government’s ability to cut taxes, invest, 
or provide a safety net. A hard landing—where higher deﬁ -
cits and debt cause investors to lose conﬁ dence in the U.S. 
economy and rising interest rates choke off the economic 
growth—is a real possibility. 
An ever-growing debt would likely hurt the 
American standard of living by fueling inﬂ a-
tion, forcing up interest rates, dampening 
wages, slowing economic growth and job cre-
ation, and shrinking the government’s ability 
to cut taxes, invest, or provide a safety net.
Future debt—a daunting picture
Traditionally, the amount of debt relative to the size of the 
economy has gone up during times of war and economic 
crisis (Figure 1). But in times of economic growth, the 
federal government has run lower annual deﬁ cits which 
allowed the debt to fall back to more sustainable levels. 
From 1941 (when the debt skyrocketed to ﬁ nance World 
War II) to 2008, U.S. debt has averaged 45 percent of 
GDP. And since 1957, the average has been even lower, at 
37 percent.2 
1 Staff calculations based on “Monthly Budget Review, Fiscal Year 2009, Congressional Budget Ofﬁ ce, November 6, 2009 and Monthly Statement of the Public Debt 
(MSPD), September, Treasury Direct.  
2 Staff calculations using historical debt data from Table 7.1, “Federal Debt at the End of the Year,” in Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2010, 
Historical Tables, Ofﬁ ce of Management and Budget, May 2009.
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Today, the course is very different. The ﬁ nancial crisis and 
recession have contributed to an extremely large increase 
in the debt, with revenue plummeting and spending ris-
ing for expensive new programs to stimulate the economy 
and stabilize the ﬁ nancial sector. But instead of a plan 
to reverse course after the economy improves, the vast 
majority of policymakers support plans to add more to the 
debt by extending most or all of the 2001 and 2003 tax 
cuts, restricting the reach of the alternative minimum tax 
(AMT), and preventing cuts in physician payments under 
Medicare’s sustainable growth rate formula, without pay-
ing for them, and thus, adding trillions to the debt over the 
coming decade. 
Under the Commission’s ﬁ scal baseline, the public debt 
is expected to grow to 85 percent of GDP by 2018. Beyond 
2018, the situation will deteriorate with the debt surpass-
ing 100 percent of GDP in 2022 and reaching 200 percent 
in 2038.
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ﬁ gure 1. Federal debt held by the public, 1940–2038
Source: Table 7.l, “Federal Debt at the End of the Year,” in Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2010, Historical Tables, Ofﬁ ce of Management and Budget, May 
2009 and the Commission’s debt projection.
The widening gap between spending and revenue will 
result from the growth in government spending, driven 
primarily by the aging population and growing health care 
costs, and a revenue base that grows more slowly. As pro-
jected by the Commission’s ﬁ scal baseline, non-interest 
spending will grow to 22 percent of GDP in 2018 and to 
27 percent in 2038. This higher spending would also cause 
interest payments to grow dramatically, adding nearly 4 
percentage points of GDP to spending in 2018 and almost 
9 points in 2038.
Revenue is also expected to grow relative to the economy but 
not by nearly enough to keep pace with projected spending, 
and the gap between the two will continue to expand over 
time (Figure 2). Revenue, which recently dropped below 15 
percent of GDP due to the recession, is expected to grow 
to 18.5 percent by 2018 and to continue to grow gradually 
thereafter. Even if the tax cuts are not extended, revenue is 
projected to remain below spending indeﬁ nitely. 
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box 2. The difference between the deﬁ cit and debt
The deﬁ cit is the difference in a given ﬁ scal year between federal revenue, and spending. The government can have 
either a deﬁ cit or a surplus. In order to ﬁ nance operations when there is a deﬁ cit, the government borrows money 
by issuing government securities to cover the deﬁ cit. 
The debt is the amount owed to creditors who have ﬁ nanced the government’s borrowing. It does not increase by 
the exact amount of the deﬁ cit, but deﬁ cits are the primary factor. The debt can also rise or fall because of changes 
in the Treasury’s operating cash balance, the exercise of sovereign monetary power, federal credit ﬁ nancing, and 
federal ﬁ nancial stabilization activities.  
The deﬁ cit and debt can be expressed both in dollars and as a percentage of GDP. The debt-to-GDP ratio and the 
debt path, or debt trends over time, are key measures of the debt in comparison to the nation’s total economy, 
and reﬂ ect the nation’s ability to manage its debt.5 For this analysis, the Commission uses publicly-held debt, as 
opposed to gross debt, which includes federal debt held internally by government trust funds to redeem future 
commitments (Box 4). 
5 For a detailed description of how the government calculates its debt, borrowing needs, and deﬁ cits, see chapter 16, “Federal Borrowing and Debt”, and 25, “Budget 
Systems and Concepts,” in Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2010, Analytical Perspectives, Ofﬁ ce of Management and Budget, May 2009.
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box 3. A closer look at the drivers of debt
Mandatory spending. In the coming years and decades, mandatory spending is projected to grow signiﬁ cantly 
as a share of the economy. The combination of population aging and growing health care costs will lead to an 
unprecedented expansion of Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security in particular. Under the Commission’s ﬁ scal 
baseline these three programs will likely grow from less than 8.5 percent of GDP in 2008 to 11 percent by 2018, and 17 
percent in 2038.6 And since this growth is automatic under the law, active policy change will be required to slow it.
Discretionary spending. Although discretionary spending has declined as a portion of the budget and economy 
since 1970, it nonetheless threatens to contribute to future spending growth. In theory this area of the budget 
is easier to monitor and control, since discretionary programs are funded and reviewed as a part of the annual 
appropriations process. Over the last decade, however, it has grown at roughly the same pace as mandatory 
spending. While the increase can be partly attributed to defense spending, even domestic spending grew at 6.3 
percent, faster than the 5.1 percent average for the economy over that time period.7 
Revenue. Although revenue is projected to grow in the coming years, this growth will be insufﬁ cient to keep pace with 
spending increases. Currently at around 15 percent of GDP—a post-1950 low caused mainly by the recession—the 
Commission’s ﬁ scal baseline projects revenue will return to around its historical average, reaching 18.5 percent by 
2018, and grow somewhat in subsequent years. Population aging and health care cost growth, in addition to putting 
upward pressure on spending, will shrink the wage base some–the former by shrinking the size of the labor force 
and the latter by shifting compensation from taxable cash-wages to non-taxed health care beneﬁ ts. Extending the 
2001 and 2003 tax cuts—even only for families making less than $250,000—will make the gap between spending 
and revenue far worse over the coming year, adding more than two trillion to the debt over the next decade.8 
Interest on the debt. The large gap between spending and revenue will require higher levels of borrowing and 
correspondingly higher interest payments. The growing interest payments create the specter of having to borrow 
more just to cover interest costs and having interest squeeze out other areas of the budget. Even under current 
law, interest costs are projected to grow faster than the economy over the next decade and under the Commission’s 
baseline, they will increase from just above 1 percent of GDP now to nearly 4 percent in 2018.
6 See CBO’s June 2009 The Long-Term Budget Outlook for a detailed description of how changes in the workforce will affect these programs.
7 Staff calculation using historical data from Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2010, Historical Tables, Ofﬁ ce of Management and Budget and CBO’s 
The Long-Term Budget Outlook, June 2009. 
8 Joint Committee on Taxation. “Estimated Budget Effects of the Revenue Provisions Contained in the President’s Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Proposal as Described 
by the Department of the Treasury,” May 2009.
Once the United States recovers from the recession and 
its effects, deﬁ cits are likely to decline from their high of 
almost 10 percent of GDP to below 6 percent over the next 
ﬁ ve years (still well above the historical average of about 
2 percent of GDP). They will then rise again as the pres-
sures of the baby boom retirement and health care cost 
growth bring about record levels of spending for pensions 
and health care. Within 30 years, deﬁ cits will reach unprec-
edented levels of 16 percent of GDP.
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The economic consequences 
of too much debt 
Excessive debt can hurt a country, its citizens, and its econ-
omy in many ways. It can harm the economy by pushing 
up interest rates—something that would be particularly 
dangerous as we are coming out of a recession. It can 
slow the growth of wages and keep living standards from 
increasing by as much as they otherwise would have, leav-
ing the country’s citizens worse off. And it deprives the 
country of the ﬁ scal ﬂ exibility to respond to future crises 
and new national priorities as they arise. With the fed-
eral debt about to expand dramatically, the risks of doing 
nothing are unacceptably high for the American taxpayer. 
Persistently growing debt levels could lead to many unde-
sirable conditions. 
 
Living standards decline. As debt increases, interest 
rates are likely to rise since the government will have to 
pay more to attract capital. This can “crowd out” private 
investment, and make it more costly to borrow for every-
thing from housing to education to business investments. 
As higher interest rates choke off investment, productivity 
growth will fall, wages will rise more slowly (or even fall), 
and the country’s standard of living will suffer. 
Interest payments rise and squeeze out other priorities. 
Greater levels of debt and higher interest rates mean ris-
ing interest payments for the government. As interest pay-
ments become a larger share of the budget, they squeeze 
out other important tax and spending priorities. Interest 
payments can also lead to a dangerous debt spiral whereby 
the interest payments themselves increase the national 
debt, compounding over time to worsen the ﬁ scal situation. 
As the government relies more on foreign creditors, 
Americans will see diminished returns from the 
investments in this country. Even though private savings 
have risen recently, they will be insufﬁ cient to ﬁ nance all 
the borrowing demands of the U.S. government and the 
private sector. In the short term, as the United States has 
seen over the past decade, foreign savings can make up the 
difference. But relying on foreign capital means that the 
interest and dividends from these investments go overseas 
and it also leaves the United States more dependent on and 
vulnerable to changes in international lenders’ investment 
preferences. 
 
As international investors become more concerned 
about U.S. ﬁ scal stability, the dollar may no longer 
be the foundation of global economic transactions. 
The United States is currently less vulnerable than many 
other nations to the full economic and ﬁ scal consequences 
of high debt because the dollar is the world’s reserve cur-
rency, and our debt remains popular with investors world-
wide as a low-risk investment. Eventually, however, coun-
tries may not see American dollars and American debt as 
so safe and the U.S. may lose the advantages that come 
with being the reserve currency. The IMF and the United 
Nations have already begun to investigate a worldwide 
reserve currency as a potential alternative to the dollar. 9
Future generations pay the price. In addition to experienc-
ing lower living standards, future generations will be left with 
the burden of paying for today’s borrowing. This will ulti-
mately mean large tax increases and large spending cuts, and 
will leave little ﬂ exibility for setting future budget priorities. 
9 Alexander Nicholson. “IMF Says New Reserve Currency to Replace Dollar Is Possible,” Bloomberg News, June 6, 2009 and United Nations, Report of the Commission 
of Experts of the President of the United Nations General Assembly on Reforms of the International Monetary and Financial System, September 21, 2009.
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How much debt can the U. S. economy reasonably sustain? 
There is no ﬁ rm answer because of the complex relation-
ship between the economy and the debt. But there is wide-
spread agreement that, if we do nothing, our economic 
way of life is at risk. Consider the following:
• At 52 percent of GDP, the federal debt is already well 
above its historical norm. Debt as a share of the econ-
omy—one gauge of how much debt the economy can 
bear—averaged 37 percent during the ﬁ fty-year period 
from 1957 to 2008.
• Without a change in policies, the debt will soar as a per-
centage of GDP in this generation’s lifetime. In about 15 
years, it will exceed the record of 109 percent set in 1946 
and continue to grow rapidly.
• The United States has never before experienced debt 
burdens as high as the current projections. Other coun-
tries with huge debt burdens suffered either chronic or 
acute ﬁ scal rises and, frequently, political crises.
• With the shares of debt held by foreign owners ris-
ing to nearly half, a loss of conﬁ dence by international 
creditors could precipitate a ﬁ nancial crisis. As we have 
seen with many other nations, growing dependence on 
international ﬁ nancing can make the nation vulnerable 
to shocks and a vicious spiral of currency declines and 
spikes in interest rates.
• Whether the debt build up leads to an abrupt, external 
shock, or a gradual erosion in our economic perfor-
mance, the growing debt will jeopardize the American 
living standard and U.S economic leadership.
ﬁ gure 3. Foreign Ownership of U.S. Debt is Growing
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10 “China Slows Purchases of U.S. and Other Bonds,” Keith Bradsher, New York Times, April 13, 2009; Wall Street Journal, July 29, 2009 “Chinese Convey Concern 
on Growing U.S. Debt;” “China ‘Worried’ by U.S. Debt” Andy Barr, March 13, 2009, Politico; “China’s Leader Says He is ‘Worried’ Over U.S. Treasuries, “New 
York Times, March 14, 2009, Michael Wines, Keith Bradsher and Mark Landler; “China Grows More Picky About Debt”, May 21, 2009. Keith Bradsher, New 
York Times; “Chinese convey concern on Growing US Debt,” Tom Barkley and Deborah Solomon, Wall Street Journal, July 29, 2009. For November 2009 quote, 
Laura Mandaro, “China’s Wen urges U.S. to keep deﬁ cit at ‘appropriate size’,” MarketWatch, November 8, 2009. 
11 James Jackson, “Foreign Ownership of U.S. Financial Assets: Implications of a Withdrawal” (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 14, 
2008). Cletus C. Coughlin, Michael R. Pakko and William Poole, “How Dangerous is the U.S. Current Account Deﬁ cit?” The Regional Economist, April 2006, 8; 
Steven B. Kamin, Trevor A. Reeve and Nathan Sheets, “U.S. External Adjustment: Is It Disorderly? Is It Unique? Will It Disrupt the Rest of the World?,” Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, International Finance Discussion Papers Series Number 892, April 2007. 
12 Alan J. Auerbach and William G. Gale, The Economic Crisis and the Fiscal Crisis: 2009 and Beyond: An Update, September 2009; Bloomberg “U.S. Treasury 
Credit Default Swaps Increase to Record,” September 9, 2008; Reuters, “US Treasury 10-year CDS hits record high,” December 1, 2008. At one point, the rate 
went up 95 basis points.
13 “Reducing deﬁ cit key to U.S. rating: Moody’s”, Reuters, October 22, 2009.
There is little disagreement that the current path is unsus-
tainable. How likely is an economic shock from U.S. grow-
ing debt and what might it look like? No one knows for 
sure. U.S. debt is still attractive for several reasons, includ-
ing American political stability and a history of economic 
growth. 
However, the United States is now more reliant on over-
seas investors and central banks than in the past, with for-
eign holdings now at approximately 50 percent of the total 
(Figure 3). As the federal debt grows over the next 10 years, 
especially without a concrete plan to reduce it, foreign 
creditors may shift their investments to other nations.
Our foreign creditors are already nervous about U.S. debt. 
In March 2009, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao expressed 
concern about U.S. economic and ﬁ scal policies, saying: 
“We have lent a huge amount of money to the U.S. Of 
course we are concerned about the safety of our assets. To 
be honest, I am deﬁ nitely a little worried.”  And again in 
November 2009, the premier called for the United States 
to control its debt: “most importantly, we hope the U.S. 
will keep its deﬁ cit at an appropriate size so that there will 
be basic stability in the exchange rate and that is conducive 
to the stability and recovery of the world economy.”10 
This shift could reduce the value of the dollar and force the 
Treasury to offer higher interest rates to attract borrowers. 
A rapid sell-off would hurt foreign investors’ portfolios as 
much as it would hurt the U.S. economy. But over time, 
foreign owners might stop buying new U.S. Treasury secu-
rities.11 While it is unclear whether a crisis would unfold 
gradually or suddenly, either would come with great costs 
to both the domestic and global economy.
And change can happen suddenly. In 2008, the credit 
default swap markets showed how suddenly investor per-
ceptions of the security and stability of Treasury securi-
ties can shift. That year, the credit default swap rate for 
Treasury bills, a measure of investor assumptions about 
the likelihood of a U.S. default, increased nearly sevenfold. 
The rate is back to “normal” levels, but this rapid increase 
shows that the United States is not immune to investor 
panic.12  And in October 2009, Moody’s Investor Service 
warned that the United States may eventually lose the tri-
ple A rating on its bonds, if it does not act to reduce its 
deﬁ cits (and its debt) over the next three to four years.13  
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The Peterson-Pew Commission on Budget Reform believes 
that establishing a ﬁ scal plan to stabilize the debt over the 
medium term is critical for averting a ﬁ scal crisis. The 
Commission recognizes that not all of the country’s ﬁ scal 
problems can be solved overnight or even in a ﬁ scal year—
indeed, rushing the process could destabilize a still shaky 
economy. But to buy breathing room, the United States 
must show its creditors that it is serious about addressing 
the nation’s unsustainable debt trajectory. 
Accordingly, the Commission urges Congress and the 
White House to adopt a ﬁ scal framework that includes:
• A commitment to stabilize the public debt over a reason-
able timeframe; 
• Speciﬁ c policies to stabilize the debt; 
• Annual debt targets with automatic enforcement mech-
anisms to ensure targets are met; and 
• A commitment to reduce further the debt level over the 
longer term. 
There are numerous policy combinations that could be 
implemented to stabilize the debt. The Commission does 
not support any single set of changes. We do believe, how-
ever, that both tax increases and spending cuts will be 
necessary. The changes needed to stabilize the debt at a 
reasonable level are large enough—particularly if expiring 
policies are extended—that it will not be feasible to rely 
solely on either tax increases or on spending cuts. 
The Commission recommends that policymakers commit 
to the following six-step plan: 
Step 1: Commit immediately to stabilize the debt at 60 
percent of GDP by 2018;
Step 2: Develop a speciﬁ c and credible debt stabilization 
package in 2010;
Step 3: Begin to phase in policy changes in 2012;
Step 4: Review progress annually and implement an 
enforcement regime to stay on track;
Step 5: Stabilize the debt by 2018; and 
Step 6: Continue to reduce the debt as a share of the econ-
omy over the longer term. 
1. Commit immediately to stabilize the debt 
at 60 percent of GDP by 2018.
Congress and the White House should immediately com-
mit to stabilizing the public debt at a reasonable level over 
the medium term. The “announcement effect” of such 
a commitment, if credible, can have positive economic 
effects by signaling that the United States is serious about 
reducing its debt. 
box 4. Public versus gross debt
The debt held by the public is a measure of the 
total debt held by individuals, corporations, and 
governments, domestic and foreign. Gross debt, 
on the other hand, also includes what the gov-
ernment has borrowed from itself—mainly from 
Social Security trust funds which ran large sur-
pluses over much of the last two decades. 
Although gross debt better reﬂ ects the govern-
ment’s future liabilities, debt held by the public is 
an important economic measure and is likely to 
have a greater effect on credit markets. While the 
money the government borrows from itself has 
little effect on the capital available for other bor-
rowers, the debt held by the public measures how 
much the government’s borrowing absorbs from 
the rest of the economy through credit markets. 
Accordingly, the Commission uses debt held by 
the public in this analysis. 
Stabilizing The Debt
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While past lessons show that cutting government spending 
or raising taxes too early can slow an economic recovery, the 
United States can learn other lessons from our own history 
and other countries’ experiences as well. Announcing a sen-
sible framework for careful debt reduction has been shown 
to improve creditors’ expectations of a country’s ﬁ scal man-
agement.14 Improving those expectations can lower investor 
perceptions of risk and thus the premiums that creditors 
demand for interest rates paid on U.S. assets. Lower inter-
est rates can, in turn, boost growth and employment—now 
critical as the economy struggles to regain its footing. In 
fact, many other countries’ debt reduction efforts stimu-
lated their economies and increased economic growth.15 
This announcement—if viewed as credible—can make the 
goal of debt stabilization easier, since the consequential 
lower interest rates can both reduce spending on interest 
payments and increase the size of the economy, relative to 
what it might have been otherwise.
From a ﬁ nancial perspective, the United 
States must persuade credit markets that it is 
serious about debt reduction. Global markets 
are more likely to embrace a plan if the goal 
has international credibility.
The Commission proposes a debt stabilization target of 
60 percent of GDP by 2018. We take a variety of consider-
ations into account when setting this threshold, including 
what we believe to be politically achievable, the right bal-
ance between economic recovery and ﬁ scal considerations, 
and the standards used by other industrial nations. 
14 Christina D Romer, “Lessons from the Great Depression for Economic Recovery in 2009,” Talk at the Brookings Institution, March 9, 2009 and Douglas W. 
Elmendorf, “The Effects of Deﬁ cit Reduction Law on Real Interest Rates,” Federal Reserve Board, Finance and Economics Discussion Series, 1996. 
15 Cottarelli, Carlo and Jose Viñals, “A Strategy for Renormalizing Fiscal and Monetary Policies in Advanced Economies,” IMF Staff Position Note, September 22, 
2009. SPN/09/22. 
16 European Commission, Public Finances in EMU– 2009, May 2009; IMF, The State of Public Finances: Outlook and Medium-Term Policies After the 2008 Crisis, 
March 6, 2009; and Carlo Cottarelli, and Jose Viñals, A Strategy for Renormalizing Fiscal and Monetary Policies in Advanced Economies, September 22, 2009. IMF’s 
guidelines would require higher-debt nations like the United States to meet higher debt reduction standards, but also allow the savings to be achieved over a 
longer period
From a ﬁ nancial perspective, the United States must per-
suade credit markets that it is serious about debt reduction. 
Global markets are more likely to embrace a plan if the goal 
has international credibility. The 60 percent debt thresh-
old is now an international standard. In the EU, under the 
requirements of the Maastricht Treaty and the Growth and 
Stability Act, EU countries must satisfy a benchmark tar-
get of 60 percent of GDP for debt and 3 percent for annual 
deﬁ cits. Likewise, the IMF has singled out the 60 percent 
debt target as a reasonable benchmark.16 Given the signiﬁ -
cant risks of high U.S. debt, a less aggressive target might be 
insufﬁ cient to reassure the markets. 
We believe a 60 percent target is the most ambitious 
and economically sensible target that can reasonably be 
achieved in this timeframe. Although we would prefer that 
the debt decline to pre-crisis levels—around 40 percent of 
GDP—the required precipitous changes could be economi-
cally damaging even if they were politically achievable. The 
Commission believes that ultimately, policymakers should 
reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio further over time. However, 
past U.S. ﬁ scal efforts have shown that setting overly 
ambitious goals greatly reduces the likelihood of success. 
Lowering the debt too quickly could also hurt the global 
economy if too many other nations cut back their spending 
at the same time in similar debt reduction efforts. 
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box 5. Signiﬁ cant debt reduction is achievable: 
International success stories
While the U.S. debt problem may seem insurmountable, other countries have succeeded in gaining control of their 
debt. They successfully addressed their long-term budgetary pressures, increased their budgetary ﬂ exibility, and 
improved their long-term economic growth. Over the past 30 years, the top-ten nations in terms of debt reduction 
efforts have, on average, reduced their public debt from 84 percent of GDP to 41 percent over 10 or 15 years. 
New Zealand
With persistent deﬁ cits that exceeded 6 percent of GDP in the 1980s, New Zealand accumulated government debt 
that was unsustainable as a share of the economy.  The country had virtually no economic growth, high inﬂ ation, 
and lost investor conﬁ dence, leading to a currency crisis that forced government action in the mid-1980s and again 
in the early 1990s.  It instituted major economic and ﬁ scal reforms to regain foreign investor conﬁ dence and in-
crease future budgetary ﬂ exibility. The government removed major regulations from the economy, including wage 
and price controls. The public sector was signiﬁ cantly downsized through spending cuts and privatizations, reduc-
ing the number of public employees by half and cutting spending by more than 7 percent of GDP. From 1986 to 
2001, the government reduced the debt from 72 percent to 30 percent of GDP.
Canada
Canada also signiﬁ cantly strengthened its economy through tackling its debt burden. The country’s combined fed-
eral and provincial government debt rose above 100 percent of GDP during the mid-1990s and the ﬁ scal situation 
worsened due to a sharp rise in interest rates and to growing international investors’ concerns about its large debt 
burden. Although ﬁ scal credibility concerns had steadily grown, the tipping point for Canada came in the aftermath of 
the Mexican peso crisis in the fall of 1994. The Wall Street Journal suggested that the Canadian dollar could be next. 
Moody’s Investor Service put Canada on a credit watch, and downgraded its debt a few months later. In response, 
Canada implemented a debt reduction plan and lowered its debt to 63 percent of GDP in 2008. To lower the debt, the 
government implemented a pay freeze on public employee salaries, eliminated 15 percent of the federal workforce, 
and made large reductions in subsidies to businesses, such as railways, agricultural industries, and cultural indus-
tries.17 As a result, Canada reduced its vulnerability to interest rate spikes and enhanced its ﬁ scal ﬂ exibility. 
Sweden
In the 1990s, following a ﬁ nancial crisis and the worst recession in Sweden since the 1930s, Sweden faced a deﬁ cit 
of over 11 percent of GDP in 1993. Soon thereafter, the government enacted a large deﬁ cit reduction plan to restore 
conﬁ dence in its currency and enhance its budgetary ﬂ exibility. It reduced its subsidies for medical and dental care, 
indexed certain taxes, and increased contribution rates for the unemployment beneﬁ t system. Ultimately, Sweden 
reduced its debt by establishing a goal to make surpluses equal 2 percent of GDP.  By 2004 Sweden was running 
budget surpluses, and in 2008 the country’s debt was 38 percent of GDP.
(continued on following page)
17 IMF, Staff Report for the 2009 Article IV Consultation. April 17, 2009, 14.
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(continued from previous page)
Debt reduction in advanced economies (percentage of GDP)
Country and Period Starting Debt Ratio Ending Debt Ratio Debt Reduction
Ireland (1987-2002) 109 32 77
Denmark (1993-2008) 80 22 58
Belgium (1993-2007) 137 84 53
New Zealand (1986-2001) 72 30 42
Canada (1996-2008) 102 63 39
Sweden (1996-2008) 73 38 35
Iceland (1995-2005) 59 25 34
Netherlands (1993-2007) 79 46 33
Spain (1996-2007) 67 36 31
Norway (1979-1984) 57 35 21
Average 84 41 42
Note: Numbers might not add due to rounding.
Source: IMF, Carlo Cottarelli, and Jose Viñals, A Strategy for Renormalizing Fiscal and Monetary Policies in Advanced Economies, September 22, 2009, table 1, 18.
Although 60 percent of GDP is a reasonable target based on 
political, economic, and international factors, ultimately what 
is most important is that policymakers develop and achieve a 
clear and widely shared ﬁ scal goal. This will allow policymak-
ers to proceed to the next step of determining how best to 
achieve that goal and assessing the tradeoffs involved. 
2. Develop a speciﬁ c and credible debt 
stabilization package in 2010. 
Focusing solely on the end goal of debt stability is not 
enough. A plan must also include a glide path for getting 
from here to there and the speciﬁ c policies that achieve the 
goal. Without a reasonable timetable for phasing in policies 
and annual debt targets, policymakers may be tempted to 
backload necessary, but politically difﬁ cult, policy changes. 
Figure 4 shows the Commission’s illustrative glide paths to 
stabilizing the debt under the Commission’s baseline and the 
current law baseline. The seven-year timeframe allows both 
paths to implement changes slowly enough to allow the eco-
nomic recovery to take hold and grow larger each year, but 
also quickly enough that savings can compound over the 
seven-year period.  It also shows that achieving the debt sta-
bilization ﬁ scal goal is much harder if the major policies that 
are slated to expire over the next few years are continued. 
In order to stabilize the debt, deﬁ cits will have to be lower than 
currently projected. Figure 5 compares the projected deﬁ cits 
under the Commission’s ﬁ scal baseline to possible deﬁ cits 
levels under the illustrative glide path towards stabilization. 
Some may assume that in order to reduce the ratio of debt 
to GDP, the country not only has to bring deﬁ cits down, it 
actually must have surpluses. In fact, the United States can 
stabilize the debt without surpluses. As long as the debt 
is growing more slowly than the economy, the ratio will 
shrink so that small deﬁ cits and a growing economy can 
accomplish the Commission’s goal. 
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The magnitude of deﬁ cit reduction needed to reach the 60 
percent goal depends on the level of debt when policymak-
ers start. Under the Commission’s ﬁ scal baseline, average 
annual deﬁ cits will be about 6 percent of GDP between 
2012 and 2018 and would need to shrink to about 2 percent 
to meet the goal (ranging from 5 percent in the early years 
to less than 1 percent by 2018). Under current law, deﬁ cits 
would average 3 percent of GDP and they would need to 
shrink to around 2 percent to meet the goal (ranging from 
about 4 percent in the earliest years down to about 1 percent 
by 2018). The more debt policymakers add before the start of 
a debt stabilization plan, the greater their burden will be later. 
Meeting a 60 percent of GDP target by 2018 will require 
signiﬁ cant adjustments, and policymakers will have to 
decide how much should come from spending cuts versus 
tax increases. We are not recommending a speciﬁ c mix but 
in our view, both will be required. 
ﬁ gure 4. Illustrative glide paths to stabilizing the debt
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ﬁ gure 5. Illustrative deﬁ cit path compared to Commission’s ﬁ scal 
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box 6. Five principles for moving towards a manageable debt level
There are many policy paths that would achieve the desired debt stabilization goal. While we do not advocate any 
single speciﬁ c set of policies, we do think that certain principles will be useful in developing the speciﬁ c plan. 
1. Do not use a sluggish economy as an excuse for delaying a plan. While recent deﬁ cits may have been nec-
essary to respond to the current economic crisis, the United States must develop a ﬁ scal exit strategy that puts the 
budget on a sustainable path, keeps the economic recovery on track, and avoids a future ﬁ scal crisis. Excessive delay 
in crafting and enacting a plan could prove destabilizing to the economy and ultimately derail the recovery. Though 
policymakers should wait until 2012 to begin to phase in major policy changes, they should commit to stabilizing the 
debt and develop the speciﬁ cs of a plan immediately. 
2. Put everything on the table. Both spending and revenue must be on the table to have any hope of a “grand bar-
gain” in which all sides have an incentive to negotiate a comprehensive package of reforms. We believe that the scope 
of the problem is so large that tax increases and spending cuts will have to be part of any ﬁ nal package. 
3. Consider the effects of policy changes on economic growth. Not all policy changes are equal. While a strong 
and growing economy will not be enough to bring the debt to a sustainable level, economic growth will make the 
task of debt stabilization much easier. Pro-growth policies—such as fundamental tax reform, improving labor force 
incentives, and protecting productive investment spending—should be given special consideration when crafting a 
plan. Given that many tax increases and spending cuts will unavoidably depress growth, policymakers should try to 
minimize those negative effects. 
4. Focus on the drivers of program growth. Any package should be weighted towards reforms of the most prob-
lematic areas of the budget. Reforms in programs that are growing faster than the economy, such as health and retire-
ment programs, are the most likely to produce compounding savings, which not only help stabilize the debt in the 
medium term but keep it from growing again over the longer term. 
5. Don’t make matters worse. Policymakers must consider the ﬁ scal implications of any bill they enact before 
adopting this framework and should offset new policies added to the budget not part of a debt stabilization package. 
The extension of a pay-as-you-go requirement and discretionary spending caps can be a modest step in this direction. 
Policymakers must recognize that the choice to extend current policies in the short term will eventually require much 
greater changes to reduce the debt.
Over the longer term, the problem is primarily on the spending 
side of the budget, resulting mainly from the aging American 
population and growing health care costs. Though revenue 
over time is projected to surpass historical averages of above 
18 percent—even if all the expiring tax cuts are extended—it 
will fall well short of projected spending levels. 
That does not mean however, that the entire solution has to 
come from changes to the programs affected by these fac-
tors—primarily Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid—or 
spending in general. To the contrary, government health 
and retirement programs will almost certainly have to grow 
as a share of the economy because of demographic and tech-
nological factors, as well as changing preferences. 
Nonetheless, the numbers do suggest that since the long-term 
problem is a spending problem, policymakers should look to 
reducing spending as a very signiﬁ cant part of any package. 
The more those reductions are structured and tied to the driv-
ers of spending growth in mandatory programs, the more the 
changes will help keep the debt stable over the longer term.
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3. Begin to phase in policy changes in 2012.
Given current economic conditions, we recommend wait-
ing to implement the policy changes until 2012. Making 
aggressive changes any earlier could harm the economy, 
particularly when unemployment is expected to remain 
high after reaching a 25-year high in October 2009 of more 
than 10 percent and the economy is expected to remain 
below its potential.18 
However, waiting longer could undermine the plan’s cred-
ibility and leave the country reliant on excessively high bor-
rowing for too long. Thus far, U.S. borrowing needs have 
been met by the strong demand for U.S. Treasury securi-
ties and (until quite recently) the dollar as a reasonably safe 
reserve currency during the current economic and ﬁ nan-
cial crises. These conditions could change abruptly—and 
are more likely to do so if no debt plan is put in place. 
In order to reach the target goal of debt stabilization by 
2018, annual deﬁ cit reductions averaging nearly 4 per-
cent of GDP would be needed if changes started in 2012. 
(Changes would actually be much smaller in the earliest 
years, growing signiﬁ cantly each year. Under our illustra-
tive glide path, deﬁ cit reduction would be less than 1 per-
cent of GDP in 2012, nearly 4 percent in 2015, and almost 
7 percent in 2018.) If changes are not begun until 2014, 
they would have to be, on average, 5 percent of GDP per 
year to meet the 2018 goal. 
The Commission recognizes policymakers may need to 
adjust the targets to reﬂ ect changes in the economic cycle. 
If the economy seriously weakens in the future, policy-
makers might need to adjust the plan to temporarily delay 
spending reductions or revenue increases. Any delay 
should be based on objective criteria, such as the ofﬁ cial 
level of unemployment or economic growth. Otherwise, 
there would be too much opportunity—and temptation—
to simply ignore the targets. 
4. Review progress annually and implement 
an enforcement regime to stay on track.
There needs to be a mechanism to help keep any plan on 
track once it is adopted. Simply pledging to meet certain 
targets may not reassure ﬁ nancial markets—there have 
been too many past examples of empty promises and bud-
get gimmickry.
The Commission recommends enacting a “debt trigger,” 
which would take effect if an annual debt target were 
missed. Any breach of the target would be offset through 
automatic spending reductions and tax increases. The 
Commission recommends that the trigger apply equally 
to spending and revenue. There would be a broad-based 
surtax, and all programs, projects, and activities would be 
subject to this trigger.19
Past automatic policy changes failed in part because so 
many programs were exempt from the trigger and it was 
so easy to bypass the restrictions. A debt trigger should be 
punitive enough to cause lawmakers to act but realistic 
enough that it can be enacted as a last resort if policymak-
ers fail to act or select policies fall short of the goal. Using 
the broadest base possible would prove far more effective 
in keeping a plan on track since a broader base expands 
the political consequences of policymakers failing to meet 
targets, creating an incentive for Congress and the White 
House to craft their own ﬁ scal policies, rather than relying 
on a formula to meet their debt targets.
5. Stabilize the debt by 2018.
Reducing the debt to 60 percent of GDP will be no small 
feat. It will require gradually bringing the debt down from 
a projected 69 percent in the ﬁ rst year of a stabilization 
plan. More signiﬁ cantly, it will require a dramatic devia-
tion from the current debt path where the debt is projected 
to reach 85 percent by 2018. Preventing that increase is 
critical so that the United States can avoid the economic 
risks of excessive debt. 
18 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment Situation Summary, November 6, 2009. 
19 By their very nature, certain spending programs will have to be exempt from a debt trigger but the Commission recommends limiting the scope of those exemp-
tions: interest payments on the debt, certain contractual commitments, international treaty obligations, intragovernmental payments, and constitutionally-
mandated requirements.
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But hitting a 60 percent target is, in and of itself, not a suf-
ﬁ cient goal. What matters just as much—if not more—is 
that the debt does not continue to grow as a share of the 
economy thereafter. Deriving a package of tax increases 
and spending cuts to bring the debt down to 60 percent 
would be easier if keeping the debt stabilized and prevent-
ing its future growth was not important. It could then 
include temporary measures, timing shifts, and short-term 
policies that did not address the major drivers of the bud-
get’s growth, including health care, retirement programs 
and certain tax policies. 
 
But hitting a 60 percent target is, in and of 
itself, not a sufﬁ cient goal. What matters just 
as much—if not more—is that the debt does 
not continue to grow as a share of the econ-
omy thereafter. 
The purpose of stabilizing the debt is to reassure credi-
tors and ﬁ nancial markets that the United States can man-
age its debt and limit its borrowing both in the medium 
and the long term. Enacting policies where the U.S. debt 
would grow again after 2018 as a share of the economy 
may not reassure them. Therefore, any stabilization pack-
age must include permanent changes in current policies 
and must be weighted to control the budget’s most prob-
lematic areas. We believe that the problem is so large that 
nearly all areas of the budget will be affected, and certainly 
both spending and taxes will have to be part of the ultimate 
plan. But reforms in programs that are growing faster than 
the economy—notably Medicare, Medicaid, and Social 
Security—will provide the greatest beneﬁ ts to long-term 
debt stability. Given the nature of these programs, many 
changes will need to be gradual—so that they provide 
some savings in the medium term but have the greatest 
impact decades into the future. 
6. Continue to reduce the debt as a share of 
the economy over the longer term. 
Though preventing the debt from expanding again over 
the long-term will be challenging given the demographic 
and health care cost pressures that exist, we believe that 
policymakers must bring the debt down below the initial 
60 percent target to something closer to the U.S. historical 
ﬁ fty-year average of below 40 percent. 
Fiscally-responsible federal policies are necessary so that 
the government has the ﬁ scal ﬂ exibility to respond to cri-
ses. Even though the United States had budget deﬁ cits 
when the economic and ﬁ nancial crises hit, the relatively 
low debt-to-GDP ratio allowed policymakers the ability to 
respond quickly and borrow large amounts without worry-
ing about the federal government’s ability to access funds. 
If the debt level had been at its current level, or where it 
is projected to grow to, responding to the economic and 
ﬁ nancial crises would have been much more challenging. 
The United States is likely to face similar crises or needs 
in the future, which is why returning not just to a sta-
ble debt ratio, but also to a lower debt ratio, is prudent. 
Implementing reforms that slow the growth of spending, 
keep revenue apace with spending, and are conducive to 
economic growth will be critical to lowering the debt level 
even further. 
Ultimately, this task will almost certainly require more 
than one attempt at debt reduction. The Commission 
expects that policymakers will recognize the importance of 
debt reduction and not consider their work done after they 
enact the ﬁ rst package of debt reduction. 
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Assessing the Commission’s proposal 
The required debt reduction should be signiﬁ cant 
but achievable. The 60 percent of GDP goal is ambi-
tious but achievable if policymakers quickly enact per-
manent structural reforms. Our framework gives policy-
makers almost two years before any deﬁ cit reduction is 
required and then only requires modest deﬁ cit reduction 
of 1 to 3 percent of GDP in the plan’s early years. Given 
the proposed seven-year time period, there will be time 
for program beneﬁ ciaries and taxpayers to adjust to the 
changes in advance of when they are phased in. 
Reforms should not jeopardize economic recovery. 
Immediate spending cuts and tax increases might delay 
or weaken the economy’s recovery. The plan puts off any 
required savings until 2012, when economic recovery 
should be ﬁ rmly in place. In the event of a future economic 
downturn, policymakers could postpone reforms to avoid 
economic consequences but only under a narrow set of 
economic conditions. However, policymakers should not 
use the recent recession as an excuse to avoid the debt chal-
lenge, which is why it is important to commit to a time-
frame and start date for phasing in changes. 
Any automatic enforcement mechanism should 
include both spending cuts and revenue increases. 
The goal of an enforcement mechanism is to be punitive 
enough to cause lawmakers to act but realistic enough that 
it can be enacted if necessary as a last resort. Our enforce-
ment mechanism applies across the board to spending 
programs and revenue alike. Applying automatic changes 
to both sides of the ﬁ scal ledger will increase the base for 
savings, lessening the impact on programs and spending, 
and will require across-the-board sacriﬁ ces from program 
beneﬁ ciaries and taxpayers. 
The executive branch should not be able to preempt 
reform by using overly optimistic assumptions. Past 
enforcement mechanisms were based on estimates from 
the executive branch. This allowed the White House to 
use overly optimistic assumptions for economic growth or 
generous estimates of recently enacted savings to manip-
ulate the targets. A sensible plan could include options 
to minimize these budgetary gimmicks such as holding 
policymakers accountable in the current year from their 
failure to meet the prior year’s targets.
Rules should be strong but ﬂ exible. The EU has found 
that the most effective budget rules are: statutory, simple 
and transparent, ﬂ exible (enough to handle legitimate 
emergencies), and enforceable.20 Our proposal meets 
these criteria by imposing a statutory framework, creating 
a simple goal (60 percent of GDP by 2018), recognizing 
that adjustments may be required for changing economic 
conditions, and including an automatic enforcement 
mechanism. 
20 European Commission, Public Finances in EMU– 2009, May 2009, 91.
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There is no question that the United States is on an 
unsustainable ﬁ scal path. The consequences are serious 
for public policy, the economy, and the standard of living 
of the American people. Structural deﬁ cits will remain 
even as the economy recovers from the current deep 
recession and the debt is on a course to reach levels never 
experienced in the United States. While it was necessary 
to ramp up deﬁ cit spending to stem the recent sharp 
decline in the economy, the United States must adopt a 
plan to stabilize the debt immediately and take the ﬁ rst 
steps down that path very soon.
History does not provide good comparisons for the mag-
nitude of the explosion in debt we face. Yes, in the imme-
diate aftermath of World War II, the U.S. debt-to-GDP 
ratio brieﬂ y exceeded 100 percent. But any similarities end 
there. After World War II, the demographics were essen-
tially reversed from today’s situation—the U.S. population 
was much younger, most U.S. debt was held domestically, 
and the government had a plan to pay back the debt in only 
a few years. 
Today, an ever-growing proportion of debt is held outside 
U.S. borders. Many fear that, if international markets 
believe the United States cannot manage its debt, it will 
be unable to continue such levels of borrowing. And as 
a result, the American economy will falter. U.S. securi-
ties may lose their value as investors ﬂ ee to alternatives. 
Further, interest rates on mortgages, car and education 
loans, and credit cards could rise to unaffordable levels. 
The cost of doing nothing is high. 
Other countries have successfully undertaken ﬁ scal con-
solidation efforts to reduce their debt. However in many 
cases, it took a debt crisis or severe international pressure 
for these nations to act. If policymakers fail to act before a 
crisis hits, citizens will pay a tremendous economic price. 
The Peterson-Pew Commission on Budget Reform believes 
that policymakers must change the ﬁ scal course to head off 
such a crisis. This will require policymakers to adopt a path 
toward sustainable debt and credibly commit to enacting 
it over the next several years. There is no question that the 
Commission’s plan will require hard choices—signiﬁ cant 
spending cuts and tax increases will be necessary to shift our 
ﬁ scal course. And we are under no illusions that any single 
ﬁ scal framework will ﬁ x the country’s ﬁ scal problems. 
The biggest factor in whether our country will succeed is 
political will—leaders will need to come together and cou-
rageously make the tough choices. Promises not to raise 
certain taxes or reduce certain beneﬁ ts only stand in the 
way of bringing politicians together to develop a realistic 
plan. Any meaningful effort to address the budget prob-
lems will have to be bipartisan, giving both major politi-
cal parties cover. Our debt should not be our destiny—the 
time to act is now. 
 
Conclusion
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